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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3276 
 ___________ 
 
 WILLIAM BULLOCK, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 BIMBO BAKERIES USA INC;  
ANGIE LASHOMB 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01902) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2011 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 22, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 William Bullock, pro se, appeals from the April 27, 2010 order of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting judgment in favor 
of Bimbo Bakeries USA and Angie LaShomb (the “Defendants”), and the July 1, 2010 
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order denying Bullock’s “Motion for Clarification” of the order of the dismissal.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Bullock’s complaint arises from the Defendants’ garnishment of Bullock’s wages 
between February 2009 and December 2009.  The garnishment was instituted pursuant to 
a Notice of Levy from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) which ordered the company1 
to turn over a percentage of Bullock’s wages to satisfy unpaid taxes.  Bullock complained 
to the company that he believed that the IRS did not have authority to apply a tax levy 
against him.  He requested that the company discontinue or reduce the garnishment, 
which they refused to do absent a written directive from the IRS.  In September 2009, 
Bullock brought suit against the Defendants asserting claims under Pennsylvania’s 
criminal theft statutes and violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.2
The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings.  The Magistrate Judge 
issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R) recommending that the Defendants’ 
motion be granted because (1) Pennsylvania law does not permit a private right of action 
for theft; (2) Bullock’s constitutional claims are not cognizable against the Defendants 
   
                                                 
1 The District Court noted that although Bimbo Bakeries USA and Angie 
LaShomb were named as Defendants, the proper company-defendant is Carlisle 
Foods, Inc.  Because the District Court dismissed the action in its entirety, it did 
not decide whether Bimbo Bakeries USA was a proper defendant in this case.  
Because we will affirm the judgment for the Defendants, we need not reach this 
issue either.     
2 The suit was originally brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Cumberland 
County, Pennsylvania.  The Defendants removed the action to federal court in 
October 2009.   
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who are private parties, rather than governmental actors; and (3) pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 
6332, Defendants are immune from liability for honoring an IRS tax levy. 
On April 27, 2010, the District Court adopted the R&R and entered judgment in 
favor the Defendants and against Bullock on all claims.  On May 24, 2010, Bullock filed 
a “Motion for Clarification” asking the District Court to clarify certain points of its order.  
On July 1, 2010, the Court denied the motion as untimely and meritless.  On July 23, 
2010, Bullock filed a Writ of Mandamus, which we treat as a Notice of Appeal.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3
                                                 
3 Even though the Appellees challenge our jurisdiction over this appeal, we are 
satisfied that we have jurisdiction.  Subject to certain exceptions, a notice of 
appeal must be filed within 30 days from the disputed order’s entry date.  Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  The District Court entered its order of dismissal on April 27, 
2010.  Bullock filed his Notice of Appeal on July 23, 2010, more than 30 days 
later.  However, on May 24, 2010, Bullock filed a Motion for Clarification of the 
District Court’s April 27 final order, which we construe liberally.  See United 
States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[F]ederal courts have long 
recognized that they have an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed 
by a pro se [litigant] and determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable 
under a different remedial statutory framework”).  Although captioned a “Motion 
for Clarification,” Bullock’s motion, which argues that the district court’s legal 
analysis was flawed, is effectively a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).  
See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Rule 59(e) is a 
‘device to relitigate the original issue’ decided by the district court, and used to 
allege legal error”) (citation omitted).  A timely filed motion under Rule 59(e) tolls 
the time to file an appeal until the District Court enters an order disposing of the 
motion.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).  Bullock filed his motion on May 24, 
2010, within the 28 days required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  Therefore Bullock had 
30 days from July 1, 2010, the date the District Court denied the Motion for 
Clarification, to file a notice of appeal.  He did so on July 23, 2010, well within 
the 30-day limit.   
  Our review of a ruling on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is plenary.  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 
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219 (3d Cir. 2005).  Judgment will be granted only where the moving party clearly 
establishes that there are no material issues of fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). 
To the extent that Bullock’s appeal challenges the District Court’s July 1, 2010 
ruling on his Motion for Clarification, we also have authority to review that order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review an order denying a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).   
III. 
The allegations in the Complaint are that the Defendants violated Bullock’s rights 
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution by garnishing 
his wages in compliance with an IRS tax levy and that the Defendants are liable to him 
for theft of monies under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1106, 3901, 3903, 3921, 3923, and 
3927.   
Anyone who honors an IRS levy “shall be discharged from any obligation or 
liability to the delinquent taxpayer and any other person with respect to such property. . . 
.”  26 U.S.C. § 6332(e).  The District Court correctly concluded that the Defendants are 
immune from liability under this provision based on the allegations in the Complaint.  
See e.g., Congress Talcott Corp. v. Gruber, 993 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 1993) (“A third 
party who honors the levy and surrenders the property has no liability to the delinquent 
taxpayer”).  Bullock’s argument that a levy on a private citizen is not enforceable without 
a court order and notice of seizure is without merit, and in any event is irrelevant as § 
6332(e) discharges the Defendants from any liability arising from its honoring of an IRS 
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levy, whether or not the levy was validly imposed.      
Even if the Defendants were not insulated from liability by § 6332(e) for 
complying with the levy, Bullock has stated no other cognizable basis for relief.  As the 
District Court properly determined, there is no private cause of action for alleged theft 
crimes under Pennsylvania law, and Bullock concedes as much in his brief on appeal.  
See Appellant’s Br. 17.  Bullock’s claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution must also fail because they cannot be maintained against 
private actors.  See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1952).  
Bullock’s complaint does not allege that the Defendants are government actors, and the 
fact that the Defendants complied with an IRS tax levy by garnishing Bullock’s wages is 
insufficient to characterize them as such.  See e.g., Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 
1029 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “where the only ‘act’ by the defendants was to 
comply with a lawful levy from the Internal Revenue Service, no reasonable person could 
conclude that the defendants can fairly be characterized as governmental actors”).  We 
have considered Bullock’s other arguments on appeal and find them without merit.   
Bullock’s Motion for Clarification did not introduce any new arguments or 
evidence and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.  
 
IV. 
For these reasons, we will affirm.    
 
